Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Many environmental problems have an element of irreversibility. If a species is lost, it is probably lost forever; the same might well be true of pristine areas. Genetically modified organisms might lead to irreversible ecological harm; transgenic crops can impose irreversible losses by increasing pest resistance. 1 In recent decades, the problem of climate change has raised the most serious concerns about irreversibility. Some greenhouse gases stay in the atmosphere for centuries, and for that reason climate change threatens to be irreversible, at least for all practical purposes.
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The risk of irreversibility is especially troublesome in light of massive uncertainty about the actual damage from climate change. Suppose that we project, with the International Panel on Climate Change, warming between 1.8 and 4.0 C by 2100. 3 There is a large difference between adverse effects at 1.8 C and adverse effects at 4.0 C. 4 Even at a specified increase in temperature, it is exceedingly difficult to know the extent of the harm. 5 If the average global temperature increases by 3.0 C one hundred years from now, the extent of the greatly damage is disputed, in part because of uncertainty about the possibility of adaptation, in part because of uncertainty about the resulting effects on global conditions. 6 There is some risk of catastrophe, and once that risk is incorporated into the analysis, the assessment of what to do changes dramatically. 7 Aggressive measures, in the form of emissions reductions or adaptation, might be justified in order to maintain flexibility in the event that either warming or actual damage turns out to be at the higher end of the range.
Concerned about the problem of irreversibility, sensible nations might consider adopting a distinctive (if admittedly vague) principle for handling certain kinds of risk:
the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle. 8 Indeed, some such principle seems to underlie prominent accounts of the Precautionary Principle, 9 which point explicitly to the problem of irreversibility. 10 For example, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change proclaims: "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing [regulatory] measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost." irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."
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In American environmental law, related ideas are at work. San Francisco has adopted its own precautionary principle, with an emphasis on irreversibility: "Where threats of serious or irreversible damage to people or nature exist, lack of full scientific certainty about cause and effect shall not be viewed as sufficient reason for the City to postpone cost effective measures to prevent the degradation of the environment or protect the health of its citizens." 13 At the federal level, the National Environmental Policy Act requires agencies to discuss "any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented." 14 Courts have been careful to insist that environmental impact statements should be prepared at a time that permits consideration of environmental effects before irretrievable commitments have been made. 15 A number of other federal statutes, especially in the environmental context, specifically refer to irreversible losses and make their prevention a high priority. 16 Within the federal courts, a special precautionary principle underlies the analysis of preliminary injunctions in cases involving a risk of irreparable environmental harm.
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For those who emphasize irreversibility, the general attitude in the face of uncertainty is "act, then learn," as opposed to the tempting and often sensible alternative of "wait and learn." For climate change, some people have believed that research should be our first line of defense. In this view, nations should refuse to commit substantial resources to reducing greenhouse gas emissions or to adaptation until evidence of serious harm is clearer than it now us. 18 To be sure, this view seems to have fewer adherents Cir 1985) . 16 See, eg, 33 USC 2712(j) (making special exception to planning requirement for use of federal resources in a situation requiring action to avoid irreversible loss of natural resources"); 42 USC 9611 (i) (same exception for Superfund cleanups); 22 USC 2151p-1 (c)(2)(A) (requiring President to assist developing countries in a way that responds to "the irreversible losses associated with forest destruction"). 17 not suggest any particular approach, but instead insists on a certain way of thinking about certain environmental problems.
I shall focus throughout on the problem of climate change, because that problem has such evident importance and because it provides a good area for exploring the underlying puzzles. But as we shall see, the exploration of those puzzles bears on a wide range of questions about appropriate precautions, not only in the environmental arena, but in other legal domains and in daily life as well.
II. Uses, Options, and Irreversibility

A. Existence Value, Option Value
Let us begin with the monetary valuation of an environmental good, such as a pristine area. Some people will be willing to pay to use the area; they may visit it on a regular basis, and they might be very upset at its loss. But others will be willing to pay to preserve it, even if they will not use it. In fact many citizens would be happy to give some money to save a pristine area, perhaps especially if animals can be found there. Hence "existence value" is sometimes included in the valuation of environmental goods, 22 and indeed federal courts have insisted that agencies pay attention to that value in assessing damages to natural resources. 23 Taken a group, citizens of many nations would be willing to pay a great deal to preserve an endangered species or to maintain the existence of a remote island and its ecosystem. In fact valuation of the damage from climate change must pay attention to the loss of species and animals, if only because human beings care about them.
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But some people are also willing to pay for the option to use or to benefit from an environmental amenity in the future, even if they are unsure whether they will exercise that option at any time. 25 Suppose that a pristine area might be developed in a way that In the domain of finance, options take multiple forms. 30 An investor might be willing to purchase land that is known to have deposits of gold. Even if the cost of extraction is too high to justify mining, ownership of the land creates an option to mine if the cost falls. 31 A standard "call option" is a right to purchase an asset prior to a specific date at a specified price. 32 (People might pay for the right to buy a share of stock in their favorite company at $50, six months from now.) In another variation, people might seek the right to abandon a project at a fixed price, perhaps on the occurrence of a specified worst-case scenario. (People might agree to perform some service for someone, but obtain the right not to perform in the event of bad weather, bad health, or some other contingency.) Alternatively, people might obtain the right to scale back a project, to expand it, or to extend its life. In another variation, people might seek the right to abandon a project at a fixed price, perhaps on the occurrence of a specified set of events.
Alternatively, they might obtain the right to scale back a project, to expand it, or to extend its life. Options that recognize multiple sources of uncertainty, of the sort that can be found for many environmental problems, are termed "rainbow options."
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Option theory has countless applications outside of the domain of investments.
People would be willing to do and possibly even to spend a great deal to preserve their option to have another child-even if they are not at all sure that they really want to have another child. Or consider narrow judicial rulings, of the sort celebrated by judicial minimalists, 34 who want courts to make decisions that are focused on particular details and that leave many questions undecided. Narrow rulings can be understood as a way of "buying" an option, or at least of "paying" a certain amount by imposing decisionmaking burdens on others, in return for future flexibility. Judges who leave things undecided, and who focus their rulings on the facts of particular cases, are in a sense forcing themselves, and society as a whole, to purchase an option to pay for flexibility in the resolution of subsequent problems. Whether that option is worthwhile depends on its price and the benefits that it provides. Or consider the case of marriage and suppose that because of law or social norms, it is difficult to divorce, so that a decision to marry cannot readily be 30 reversed. If so, prospective spouses might be willing to do a great deal to maintain their flexibility before marrying-far more than they would be willing to do if divorce were much easier.
It should be readily apparent how an understanding of option value might explain the emphasis, in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other environmental statutes, on irreversible losses. The central point of NEPA is to ensure that government officials give serious consideration to environmental factors before they take action that might threaten the environment. 35 If the government is building a road through a pristine area, drilling in Alaska, or licensing a nuclear power plant, it must produce an "environmental impact statement" discussing the environmental effects. The production of these statements can be burdensome and costly. But when potentially irreversible losses are involved, and when officials cannot specify the magnitude or likelihood of such losses, the public, and those involved in making the ultimate decision, ought to know about them.
B. Options, Imperfect Knowledge, and Precautions
It should now be clear that the idea of option value might help support an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle. The most influential essay was written by Kenneth Arrow and Anthony Fisher, who demonstrate that the ideas of uncertainty and irreversibility have considerable importance to the theory of environmental protection.
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Arrow and Fisher imagine that the question is whether to preserve a virgin redwood forest for wilderness recreation or instead to open it to clear-cut logging. Assume that if the development option is chosen, the destruction of the forest is effectively irreversible.
Arrow and Fisher argue that it matters whether the authorities cannot yet assess the costs or benefits of a proposed development. If development produces "some irreversible transformation of the environment, hence a loss in perpetuity of the benefits from preservation," then it is worth paying something to wait to acquire the missing information. Their suggestion is that "the expected benefits of an irreversible decision 41 Posner, supra note, at 161-62. 42 Id. at 162.
catastrophic risks as well, including those associated with genetically modified crops.
The general point here is that, as in the stock market, those involved in environmental protection are trying to project a stream of good and bad effects over time;
the ability to project the stream of effects will improve and hence much can be gained from being able to make the decision later in time rather than earlier. If better decisions can be made in the future, then there is a value to putting the decision off to a later date.
The key point is that uncertainty and irreversibility should lead to a sequential decisionmaking process. If better information will emerge, regulators might seek an approach that preserves greater flexibility, at least if that approach is not too costly. The extent of the appropriate "irreversibility premium" depends on the details.
III. Seriousness and Sunk Costs
Even under this account, the idea of irreversibility remains highly ambiguous. Let us consider two possible interpretations. Under the first, an effect is irreversible when restoration to the status quo is impossible or at best extremely difficult, at least on a relevant timescale. For example, the "decision not to preserve a rich reservoir of biodiversity such as the 60 million-year-old Korup forest in Nigeria is irreversible. The alteration or destruction of a unique asset of this type has an awesome finality." 43 If this is the appropriate interpretation of irreversibility, then it is an aspect of seriousness. A second interpretation, standard in the economic literature on options, sees irreversibility in terms of sunk costs. The two interpretations lead to different understandings of the problem of irreversibility and the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle.
A. Irreversibility and Seriousness
Under the first interpretation, the initial question is whether a clear line separates the reversible from the irreversible. 44 Perhaps we have a continuum, not a dichotomy. At first glance, these points underline the mundane point that permanent or longterm harms are more serious than short-term harms, under a framework suggestion that the extent of appropriate precautions depends on the size of the harms and the cost and burden associated with preventing or (if possible) reversing them. If climate change cannot be reversed at all, we should take more aggressive precautions than we would if it can be reversed only at great expense, monetary or otherwise-and if it can be reversed only at great expense, we would take more precautions than we would if it would be easy to reverse it.
But there is a larger conceptual point here, which is that whether a particular act is "irreversible" depends on how it is characterized. Any death, of any living creature, is whole. 47 As we shall shortly see, significant and even irreversible harms may well be on all sides of risk-related problems, and a focus on one set of risks will give rise to othersperhaps environmental risks as well.
B. Lost Amenities, Sunk Costs, and Imperfect Knowledge
Analysts of irreversibility and options understand the idea of irreversibility in a different and technical way. 48 Irreversible investments are sunk costs-those that cannot be recovered. Examples include expenditures on advertising and marketing, or even capital investments designed to improve the performance of a factory. In fact the purchase of motor vehicles, computers, and office equipment is not fully reversible, because the purchase cost is usually significantly higher than resale value. Examples of reversible investments include the opening of bank accounts and the purchase of bonds.
The problem with an investment that is irreversible is that those who make it relinquish "the possibility of waiting for new information that might affect the desirability or timing of the expenditure, and this lost option value is an opportunity cost that must be included as part of the investment." 49 This, in short, is the economic conception of irreversibility that I mean to emphasize here.
Many people agree that we should characterize, as irreversible harms, environmental effects that are both serious and extremely expensive and time-consuming to reverse. This is the understanding that leads Posnher and others to argue for the purchase of an "option" to slow down climate change at a lower rate in the future.
Immediate adoption of a policy produces a "sunk benefit." The argument is correct and important, but it neglects an important point: Irreversibility, in the relevant sense, might well lie on all sides. Regulation that reduces one (irreversible) environmental risk might well increase another such risk. Efforts to reduce climate change and other dangers associated with fossil fuel use, for example, may lead to increased dependence on nuclear energy, which threatens to produce irreversible harms of its own; in China, nuclear 47 See Sunstein, supra note. 48 See Avinash Dixit and Robert Pindyck, Investment under Uncertainty 6 (1994) ("When a firm makes an irreversible investment expenditure, it exercises, or "kills," its option to invest. It gives up the possibility of waiting for new information to arrive that might affect the desirability or timing of the expenditure, and this lost option value is an opportunity cost that must be included as part of the investment."). 49 Id. at 6. energy has been actively defended as a way of combating climate change. 50 As with the 56 My conclusion is that if irreversibility is defined in economic terms, pointing to the value of preserving flexibility for an uncertain future, it provides a distinctive and plausible understanding of the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle.
As we will see, this understanding also helps explains some of the most important functions of NEPA.
IV. Irreversibility and Incommensurability
The first conception of irreversibility misses something important. When people say that the loss of a pristine area, or of a species, is irreversible, they do not merely mean that the loss is grave and that it takes a great dal to provide adequate compensation. They mean that what is lost is incommensurable-that it is qualitatively distinctive, and that when we lose it, we lose something that is unique.
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The central claims here are that human goods are diverse and that we do violence to our considered judgments about them when we line them up along a single metric. This claim-a challenge to prominent understandings of utilitarian conceptions of value 60 -should not be confused. Of course people are willing to make trade-offs among qualitatively diverse goods, and they do so all the time. We will pay a certain amount, and no more, to be able to protect members or an endangered species or to visit the beach, or to help preserve it in a pristine state; we will not pay an infinite sum to see our friends, or even to maintain our friendships; we will take some precautions, but not others, to protect our children. To say that a good is not fungible is not to say that it is infinitely valuable. To say that a good lacks substitutes is not to deny that people will give up some amount, and not more, to preserve it. The emphasis on incommensurability is not meant to deny that tradeoffs are made. The point is only that when a loss is deemed irreversible, it is because it is not believed to be fungible with other human goods. Many of those who are concerned about irreversible harms intend to stress this point. What is gained by an understanding of incommensurability is a more vivid appreciation of why certain losses cannot be dismissed as mere "costs."
These points are closely connected with important claims in environmental ethics. 61 On one view, "not everything is substitutable for everything else through the medium of utility. And a corollary of that fact is the further fact that some things are 59 See Hsiung and Sunstein, supra note. 60 See Nussbaum, supra note. 61 For an illuminating discussion, see Robert Goodin, Green Political Theory (1992).
irreplaceable." 62 A wild and scenic river, for example, might be valued because of its origins and history; a restoration of that river, as for example through an artificial watercourse, would not provide an adequate substitute. 63 Foundations for this view might be found in a claim that natural processes have some kind of intrinsic value, simply because they are natural. 64 If that idea seems implausible or contentious, at least we might be able to agree that certain decisions would produce losses that are in a moral sense irreversible even if that claim seems mysterious from the standpoint of economic theory. 
V. Environmental Injunctions
An understanding of these points helps to explain some longstanding disputes about the issuance of preliminary injunctions in environmental cases. For many years, some courts of appeals had held that when environmental harm was alleged, district 62 Id. at 60. 63 Id. at 41. 64 Id.
courts should adopt a presumption of irreparable damage and indeed a presumption in favor of injunctive relief. 65 On a widespread view, environmental harms are presumed to be irreparable and to provide an appropriate occasion for such relief. 66 In NEPA cases, the result was a likely injunction if the agency had failed to prepare an adequate environmental impact statement: "Irreparable damage is presumed when an agency fails to evaluate thoroughly the environmental impact of a proposed action." 67 Apparently the idea is that if no environmental impact statement is provided, or if any such statement is inadequate, the risk to the environment is presumed to be irreparable, perhaps in the sense Does it follow that injunctions will issue in any case in which a private or public institution has failed to comply, even as a technical matter, with federal environmental law? Does it follow, for example, that the United States Navy must be enjoined from conducting weapons-training operations before it has obtained a permit to discharge ordnance into the sea?
In response to the last question, the Supreme Court offered a negative answer. 68 Rejecting the idea that environmental violations should give rise to automatic injunctions, the Court said that an injunction is an equitable remedy, subject to traditional balancing, and that it would "not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles" permitting district courts to exercise their discretion. 69 In a subsequent case, involving the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, the Court underlined the point and expressly rejected the presumption of irreparable harm in environmental cases. 70 "This presumption is contrary to traditional equitable principles." 71 Nonetheless, the Court stressed environmental problems raise distinct issues, because "[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., Indeed, the latter statement seems to be an implicit recognition of the incommensurability problem. Principle, adapted to the NEPA setting, and resting on some combination of the accounts of irreversibility offered here.
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Judge Breyer did not contend that a presumption in favor of injunctive relief would be appropriate for environmental cases in general. Instead he argued that NEPA is meant to prevent a particular kind of injury, one that should play a central role in the decision whether to grant an injunction. The purpose of NEPA is to ensure that officials take environmental considerations into account before they embark on a course of action.
"Thus, when a decision to which NEPA obligations attach is made without the informed environmental consideration that NEPA requires, the harm that NEPA intends to prevent has been suffered." 81 That harm is not adequately described as a harm to the environment as such. 82 The harm is instead the increased risk of harm to the environment that arises "when governmental decisionmakers make up their minds without having before them an analysis (with prior public comment) of the likely effects of their decision upon the harm "may well have to do with the psychology of decisionmakers, and perhaps a more deeply rooted psychological instinct not to tear down projects once they are built." 84 The problem is that "real environmental harm will occur through inadequate foresight and deliberation." 85 Judge Breyer's point, then, is that "the district court should take account of the potentially irreparable nature of this decisionmaking risk to the environment when considering a request for preliminary injunction." 86 We can understand this analysis in one of two ways, corresponding to the two conceptions of irreversible environmental harm. The first involves the distinctive value of (some) environmental amenities and the risk that once they are lost, they are lost forever. 
VI. Qualifications and Conclusions
The basis for an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, along with an understanding of its limitations, are now in place. We lack any kind of algorithm for implementing that principle. But we should be able to that when a harm is irreversible in the sense that it is very costly or impossible to make restoration, special precautions may be justified; that it often makes sense to "buy" an option to preserve future flexibility; and that the loss of cherished and qualitatively distinctive goods deserves particular attention.
But there are three important qualifications, involving the idea of optimal delay, distributional considerations, and what I shall call precommitment value. Let us briefly explore each of these.
A. Irreversibilities and Optimal Delay
The general notion of optimal delay provides important countervailing considerations. Future generations will almost certainly be both wealthier and more knowledgeable than the current generation. For this reason, they will be in a far better position, and possibly an unimaginably better position, to handle environmental problems that materialize in their time. 88 According to the Thomas Schelling, the nearly inevitable increase in wealth over time means that it "makes no sense to make current generations 'pay' for the problems of future generations." 89 Why should the relatively poor present transfer its limited resources to benefit the future, which is likely to be relatively rich?
There is another problem. Expensive investments in precautions-such as greenhouse gas reduction-may turn out to diminish available resources for future generations, leaving them with less to use to control the damage that actually occurs.
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The argument for "wait and learn" is strengthened by these points. But any such argument must also take account of the incontrovertible fact that waiting simultaneously threatens to diminish the flexibility of future decisionmakers, and perhaps severely. 91 Compare the loss of endangered species; because the loss is permanent, we have to be careful about delaying precautionary measures designed to ensure their continued existence.
B. Irreversibilities, Distribution, and the Least Well-off
At first glance, an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle might seem to be especially beneficial to disadvantaged people. 92 In the context of climate change, aggressive precautions are projected to give far more to poor countries than to rich ones, partly because rich nations are so much less dependent on agriculture. 93 Nonetheless, there is no simple connection between distributional goals and an emphasis on irreversible harms. Some of the risks associated with genetic engineering are irreversible, but the benefits of genetic engineering are likely to be felt most in poor nations. In the context of climate change, poor countries, including India and China, cannot easily afford aggressive regulation; they might be better off if they are allowed to continue to emit greenhouse gases.
In short, the analysis of distributional goals must be undertaken separately from the analysis of irreversibility. Sometimes we will hurt the least well-off, rather than help them, if we buy an option to preserve our own flexibility. The cost of the option might be paid mostly by those who can least afford it.
C. Precommitment Value
I have emphasized the value of preserving our flexibility. But in some domains, future flexibility is undesirable, and individual and societies are willing to pay a great deal to eliminate it. ourselves to taking certain courses of action if we are attacked; the precommitment creates deterrence.
In the environmental context, regulators might be willing to pay for precommitment strategies that will operate as a constraint on any number of problems, including interest-group power, myopia, weakness of will, cognitive biases. Indeed, the conventional Precautionary Principle, understood to place a thumb on the scales in favor of environmental protection, might be explained in these terms. 95 Perhaps the principle can be understood not as an effort to preserve flexibility, which can be bad, but on the contrary as an effort to ensure a commitment to a course of action that will protect the environment.
The difficulty, for any such explanation, should now be familiar: any precommitment strategy may give rise to problems, including environmental problems, for which a precommitment strategy might also be justified. It is nonetheless important to see that option value is sometimes paralleled by "precommitment value," for which regulators might be willing to spend a great deal.
Conclusion
The concept of irreversibility might be taken to refer to the sheer gravity of certain losses, and ideas about both permanence and magnitude play a large role in intuitions about environmental protection. I have suggested, however, that the concept is best understood in two distinctive ways. On the economic account, the concern about irreversibility refers to people's willingness to pay a premium to maintain flexibility for the future. In many settings, it makes sense to pay for an option to avoid a risk of losses that are irreversible in the sense that they cannot be recouped sometimes argue in favor of delaying, rather than accelerating, environmental protection.
Whether it does so depends on what is known about the magnitude and likelihood of the relevant effects. It is necessary to assess both of these in order to know how to proceed.
On an alternative view, the idea of irreversibility points to the qualitative distinctness of certain environmental goods, and the implausibility of suggesting that those goods are fungible with money. Of course such goods are not infinitely valuable.
But it is obtuse to think that wildlife or pristine areas are valued in the same way as their cash equivalents. Anyone who believed in such equivalence would have an unrecognizable understanding of how wildlife and pristine areas are properly appreciated and experienced. This understanding of irreversibility is difficult to operationalize; it does not suggest any particular specification of an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle.
But it does, I suggest, help to illuminate important areas of federal law, including the courts' relative willingness to issue injunctions in environmental cases.
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